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had adversely affected the income of motion picture theaters at the
time of the fire.24 In other words, the broad evidence rule permits a
wide latitude in the ascertainment of actual cash value. Depending on
the circumstances the application of the rule may be favorable either
to the insurer or the insured. For example, if in the above case the
business climate and conditions surrounding the theater had been
very good, the jury might have found a higher actual cash value.
It is submitted that the court in the principal case adopted the
most equitable rule. However, since recovery under casualty insurance
policies is predicated upon the actual cash value of the property at the
time of the loss, it is important that both insurer and insured remain
aware of the actual value of the structure. As was pointed out above,
where the policy contains a co-insurance clause, the insurer may try to
show that the actual cash value is great enough so as to make the in-
sured a co-insurer. On the other hand, of course, the insured will want
to introduce evidence tending to show a low actual cash value so as
to avoid being a co-insurer. It is. important, therefore, that both
parties and especially the insured, be cognizant of the factors con-
sidered in such a determination. For the insured may wish to increase
or reduce his insurance coverage in accordance with changes in the
actual cash value. Hence, it is suggested that for the protection of the in-
sured he should make a periodic review of the factors which go to




The tenancy by the entireties has a long history at common law
as an incident of the concept of the legal unity of husband and wife,
it being a form of joint ownership that can only be vested in a hus-
band and wife.' As a result of the abolition of the unity of spouses
many jurisdictions have completely abolished this type of ownership,
others have extensively modified it, while some retain the tenancy
with most of its original characteristics. 2 The peculiar characteristic
2112 F.2d 821, 825-26 n.7 (3d Cir. 1954).
'Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 403, 164 N.E. 613 (1929); 2 Tiffany, Real Proper-
ty § 431 (3 d ed. 1939).
-For an excellent discussion of tenancy by the entireties and classification
into groups see Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 Temp. L.Q. 24 (1951)-
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of a tenancy by the entireties is that each spouse has the possibility
of becoming the sole owner of all the property by surviving the other.
One spouse cannot defeat this right by a unilateral act; in other words,
both must consent to any disposal of the property.3 As a result of the
limitation on alienation only joint creditors are able to reach the
property in satisfaction of a debt.
4
Virginia is one of the jurisdictions which still retains the ten-
ancy by the entireties in its original common law form.5 What ap-
pears to be a case of first impression in any state concerning one
incident ofthe tenancy arose in a bankruptcy proceeding in Virginia in
which a joint creditor sought to reopen a closed estate for consolidation
with the subsequent bankruptcy proceeding of the other spouse. In the
case of In the Matter of Rezd,6 a husband and wife owned property
by the entireties. The husband upon filing a petition in bankruptcy
was duly adjudicated a bankrupt, and on May , i96o, he was granted
a discharge. The estate was closed on August 16, 196o. On October
18, i96o, his wife filed a petition in bankruptcy. A joint creditor, who
had not participated in the earlier proceeding, moved to reopen the
husband's estate for consolidation of the proceeding with that of
his wife, so that property held by entireties could be reached. The
'Ades v. Caplan, 132 Md. 66, io3 Ad. 94 (1918); McCubbin v. Stanford, 85
Md. 378, 37 At. 214 (1897); Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass., 403, 164 N.E. 613 (1929);
Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 66 S.E.2d 599 (1951).
In Allen v. Parkey, 154 Va. 739, 149 S.E. 615 (1929) the court denied a partition
of land held by the entireties because there is no separate interest in either tenant.
The seismn is "per tout et non per my"
"[T]he survivor of the marriage, whether the husband or the wife, is entitled to
the whole, which right cannot be defeated by a conveyance by the other to a
stranger, as in the case of joint tenancy. " 2 Tiffany, Real Property § 430 at
218 (3d ed. (1939).
4Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1931); In re Kearns, 8 F.2d 437
(4th Cir. 1925); Ades v. Caplan, 132 Md. 66, 1o3 Atl. 94 (1918); Frey v. McGaw, 127
Md. 23, 95 Ad. 96o (1915); Jordan v. Reynolds, io 5 Md. 288, 66 At. 37 (1907);
Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N.C. 682, 125 S.E. 490 (1924); Martin v. Lewis, 187 N.C.
472, 122 S.E. 18o (1924).
If judgment is obtained by an individual creditor he has only a potential lien
based on the contingent expectancy of that spouse surviving and the creditor cannot
complain of a conveyance. Kenn v. Palumbo, 6o F.2d 480 (3d Cir. 1932); Wylie v.
Zimmer, 98 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
The creditor of the husband can levy and sell the property and the purchaser
has a right to immediate possession, but this possession is subject to being defeated
by the wife surviving. Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 4o3 , 164 N.E. 613 (1929); Raptes
v. Gheros, 259 Mass. 37, 155 N.E. 787 (1927).
5Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 Temp. L.Q. 24 (1951); Ritchie, Tenancies by
the Entireties in Real Property with Particular Reference to the Law of Virginia,
28 Va. L. Rev. 6o8 (1941) contains a discussion of how to create tenancy by the
entireties m Virginia and the applicable statutes.
G198 F. Supp. 689 (WD. Va. 1961).
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District Court granted the motion, basing its decision on an interpre-
tation of Section 2(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Act which provides for
reopening an estate upon showing of good cause.7 The bankrupt
ar gued that the court should not exercise its discretion to reopen the
estate because the petitioner was barred by laches, since he failed to
seek a stay of discharge until a judgment against the joint debtors
could be obtained in a state court. The court rejected this argument on
the ground that laches was a good defense only when third persons
would be injured by granting the relief sought,8 and here there was
no possibility of injury to third persons.
The purpose of a bankruptcy proceeding is twofold: 9 to relieve
the debtor of a hopelessly indebted situation, and more importantly,
to enable creditors to receive as much by way of payment as possible.
In order to achieve these ends, title to property held by the bank-
rupt passes to the trusteeO to be administered in the most advan-
tageous way. However, the trustee receives title only to property which
is capable of being transferred by the bankrupt at the time the petition
is filed.' Since property held by entireties is incapable of being trans-
ferred by one of the spouses, it does not pass to the trustee.12 Hence it
is not available for the payment of the bankrupt's debts, and the in-
dividual bankrupt receives his discharge without losing his interest
in property so held.
Several techniques have been used by the courts to enable joint
creditors with good and valid claims, who would otherwise have their
claims against the bankrupt extinguished if a discharge was granted,
to reach property which did not pass to the trustee. In the leading
case of Lockwood v. Exchange Bank13 the creditor was the holder
of the bankrupt's joint note which waived a homestead exemption.
This property did not pass to the trustee under Section 7o(a) of the
Bankruptcy Act.14 The creditor petitioned for a stay of discharge
,Bankruptcy Act § 2(a)(8), 52 Stat. 843 (1938), 1i U.S.C. § ii(a)(8) (1958).
'Brust v. Irving Trust Co., 129 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
OPhillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764, 765 (4th Cir. 1931).
"-Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § i1o(a) (1958).
"Everett v. Judson, 228 U.S. 474 (1913); Kerin v. Palumbo, 6o F.2d 480 (3d Cir.
1932); Dioguardi v. Gurran, 35 F.2d 431 (4th Cir. 1929); In re Kearns, 8 F.2d 437
(4th Cir. 1925); Wylie v. Zimmer, 98 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Pa. 1951); Bankruptcy Act §
70(a)(5), 52 Stat. 879 (1938), U.S.C. § iio(a)(5) (1958).
"2Kerm v. Palumbo, 60 F.2d 480 (3d Cir. 1932); Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d
764 (4th Cir. 1931); Dioguardi v. Curran, 35 F.2d 431 (4 th Cir. 1929); In re Kearns,
8 F.2d 437 (4th Cir. 1925); Wylie v. Zimmer, 98 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Pa. 1951);
Vonville v. Dexter, i18 Ind. App. 187, 76 N.E.2d 856 (1948).
1190 U.S. 294 (1903).
'Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § i1o(a) (1958).
,962]
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until judgment on the note could be obtained in a state court, and he
could levy on the property. The court granted the stay because the
creditor had a valid claim but since the property did not pass to the
trustee in bankruptcy, his only remedy was in the state court. The
court reasoned that to grant a discharge knowing that the creditor had
a claim on this exempt property would be tantamount to legal fraud,
for once the discharge was granted the debt would be barred.15
In Phillips v. Krakower,16 which is heavily relied upon in the
principal case, there was a petition filed seeking a stay of discharge
until the holder of a joint note could obtain a judgment on it in a
state court. The makers of the note owned property by the entireties,
and one of the tenants was a bankrupt. Therefore, the only way the
joint creditor could reach the property held by the entireties, title to
which did not pass to the trustee, to satisfy his debt was to proceed in
a state court. The court held that if the discharge was granted before
the state court judgment was obtained the bankrupt's liability on
the note would be extinguished, thus precluding the creditor from
subjecting the property to payment during the bankrupt's lifetime
because of the tenancy by the entirety. Therefore, the court reasoned
that the stay should be granted in order to avoid this consequence.17
Essentially the same principles are involved in the principal case
as in the Lockwood and Krakower cases. Although the creditor in
Reid was not seeking a stay of discharge, the discharge already having
been granted, he was seeking a decree to reopen the estate and to
consolidate it with that of the wife's in her bankruptcy proceedings.
Nevertheless, the cases are similar in that creditors would lose a valid
claim if the relief sought is denied because in all three the property
sought to be reached had not passed to the bankruptcy trustee for
administration. In other words, in all three cases creditors were peti-
tioning the bankruptcy court to use its broad equity powers to sub-
ject property, which has not passed to the trustee, to payment of a
valid claim which would otherwise be lost.
Bankruptcy courts have always exercised broad equitable powers
concerning the bankrupt's estate, but prior to 1938 an estate could
be reopened only if it appeared that the estate had not been fully
administered.18 The Chandler Act broadened the power to reopen
1'i9o U.S. at 3oo.
146 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. i93i).
"7Id. at 765, "We cannot conceive that any court would lend it- aid to the
accomplishment of a result [legal fraud] so shocking to the conscience."
a'Kinder v. Scharff, 231 U.S. 517 (1913); In re Schreiher, 23 F.2d 428 (2d Cir.
1928); In re Chapman, 55 F.2d 965 (N.D.N.Y. 1930).
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an estate by adding the last clause to Section 2(a)(8) by which an estate
can be reopened "for cause shown."' 9 Thus the powers of the court
with relation to reopening estates were greatly increased, and now
the reopening may be granted or refused in the discretion of the
court, exercised on principles of equity.20 However, this discretion
should be exercised sparingly and only in unusual circumstances lest
the bankrupt will never receive the assurance of a finally settled
estate.
As pointed out by counsel for the bankrupt the creditor could
have followed a procedure like that outlined in Krakower by moving
for a stay of discharge until judgment could be obtained on the note
and the property subjected to payment of the claim. The creditor
could have also entered into the proceedings and received a dividend.21
However, notwithstanding the failure to seek a stay or file a claim, the
creditor should not be denied his request to reopen the estate under
the circumstances shown in the Reid case. The husband's discharge
included his obligation in the joint debt held by the petitioner, so
that the only chance of satisfying the claim was dependent upon the
wife's contingent right of sole ownership. This position was apparently
at the creditor's choice.
When, however, the wife subsequently filed a petition in bank-
ruptcy, as she did here, and is allowed to proceed to a discharge the
creditor would be left holding a good claim without any remedy to
satisfy it, and the bankrupts' still retaining all their property held by
the entireties. To allow such a result, merely because the creditor
failed to avail himself of a more expeditious method of obtaining
satisfaction, would be tantamount to fraud upon the creditor.
Therefore, the court should exercise its discretion and allow the
reopening of the first estate and then consolidate it with the one
presently in bankruptcy. This was done by the District Court in the
Reid case so as to enable a joint creditor holding a good claim to
reach joint property. To have held otherwise would be tantamount to
condoning fraudulent bankruptcy proceedings.
GARNET L. PATrERSON II
19Bankruptcy Act § 2(a)(8), 52 Stat. 843 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § ii(a)(8) (1958).
"Grand Union Equip. Co. v. Lippner, 167 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1948); In re Stein,
III F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); In re Ostermayer, 74 F. Supp. 8o3 (D.N.J. 1947);
In re Kneg, 37 F. Supp. 559 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
"Ades v. Caplan, 132 Md. 66, io3 At. 94 (1918).
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CITIZEN'S ARREST
The traditional requirement of a warrant to arrest for a breach
of the peace not committed in the presence of the arresting party can
occasionally hamper police officers in maintaining order. A patrolman
often arrives upon the scene after an altercation has ended, but be-
fore order has been restored. The officer then cannot make an arrest
until the proper warrant has been obtained. If he arrests without a
warrant, the arrest may be annulled by the courts and the arresting of-
ficer sued for false arrest or false imprisonment. In an apparent effort
to extend protection to officers who arrest for misdemeanors without a
warrant, the highest court of New York, in the case of People v.
Foster,1 recently found an unusual type of citizen's arrest.
People v. Foster arose out of a New York City street-fight in which
the defendant, a Negro girl, battled with a woman shopkeeper whose
daughter allegedly had taunted her. After first blows had fallen, the
defendant and two companions left the scene to summon one of their
parents. When they returned, the shopkeeper, a Mrs. Salzberg, had
retreated into the building and locked the door. Several dozen po-
licemen arrived to find the defendant outside the shop loudly abusing
Mrs. Salzberg before the many onlookers. The officers arrested the
defendant upon the complaint of Mrs. Salzberg. The defendant was
convicted of disorderly conduct and appealed to the New York Court
of Appeals on the ground that the arrest without a warrant was illegal
because the underlying assault for which the defendant was arrested
had not been committed in the officer's presence.2
Speaking for three members of the court, Judge Desmond found
that the underlying breach of the peace was still in progress when
the officers arrived on the scene, and thus the arrest without a war-
rant was permissible and, secondly, that the shopkeeper had made a
"citizen's arrest" of the defendant. 3
The citizen's arrest was based on the theory that the police took
11o N.Y.2d 99, 176 N.E.2d 397, 217 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1961).
'The court, in affirming the conviction, struggled to justify the arrest, with
three of the judges basing the decision on two alternative grounds; a fourth mem-
ber of the court concurring in the holding on one ground only, and the three re-
maining judges dissenting.
rIhe dissent's criticism of the first basis of the decision-that of a continuing
breach of the peace-is that since the defendant left the scene between the initial
altercation and the later disorder which was in progress when the police arrived,
the original assault could not possibly be continuing. The majority opinion ignores
the departure of the defendant, which would seem to make the first ground for
the decision untenable.
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the defendant into custody following an arrest by Mrs. Salzberg. This
theory may prove to be a novel and extremely useful device for ac-
complishing arrests for misdemeanors without a warrant. The facts
of X ,olpie v. Foster do not suggest that Mrs. Salzberg intended to
arrest the defendant. There is no indication that the shopkeeper
mentioned an arrest or made any move to effect one, nor was the
defendant conscious of having been arrested by Mrs. Salzberg. Indeed
during the entire period when Mrs. Salzberg might have arrested
defendant, a locked door separated the two women.
The two New York cases 4 cited in the principal case involved
valid initial arrests carried out by private individuals in accordance
with the settled requirements of a legitimate arrest, the police officers
taking into custody individuals who had been previously arrested. But
they do not support People v. Foster, in which the facts show that the
defendant was arrested solely on the basis of an unsworn complaint,
which under these circumstances is clearly illegal.
A proper citizen's arrest includes all the elements common to
valid arrests in general, but civilians may lawfully apprehend criminals
without a warrant only in well-defined circumstances. To constitute
an arrest, there must be an intent to arrest, under real or pretended
authority, accompanied by a seizure or detention which is so under-
stood by the one arrested.5 A private person making an arrest must
always give notice of his intention, 6 unless the arrestee knows or
ought to know under what authority the arrest is being made.7 Unless
there is statutory authority, neither an officer nor a private citizen
may arrest for a misdemeanor unless it constitutes a breach of the
peace committed in his presence.8 A private person may arrest for a
felony which has in fact been committed, provided he has reasonable
grounds for believing the arrestee guilty of committing it.9
Many states have given statutory authority to officers' 0 and to
'People v. Ostrosky, 95 Misc. 1o4, 16o N.Y.S. 493 (Nassau County Ct. 1916);
People ex rel. Gunn v. Webster, 75 Hun. 278, 26 N.Y.S. ioo7 (5th Dep't 1894).
'Jenkins v. United States, 161 F.2d 99 (i o th Cir. 1947); Melton v. State, 75 So.
2d 291 (Fla. 1954); State ex rel. Sadler v. District Court, 70 Mont. 378, 225 Pac. iooo
(1924); Lester v. Albers Super Market, Inc., 94 Ohio App. 313, 114 N.E.2d 529 (1952);
Neapolitan v. United States Steel Corp., 149 N.E.2d 589 (Ohio Ct. of App. 1956).
8Brooks v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. 352 (1869); ALI Code Crim. Proc. 249
(Official Draft 1930).
'Robinson v. State, 93 Ga. 77, 18 S.E. ioi8 (1893); Croom v. State, 85 Ga. 718,
it S.E. 1035 (i89o).
'ALI Code Crim. Proc. 231-33 (Offical Draft 1930).
DALI Code Crim. Proc. 240-41 (Official Draft 193o).
"°ALI Code Crum. Proc. 232 (Official Draft 1930); Warner, "Investigating the
Law of Arrest," 26 A.B.A.J. 151, 152 (1940).
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private11 individuals to arrest for certain types of misdemeanors com-
mitted in their presence, although not amounting to a breach of the
peace. But almost nowhere is an officer,1 2 and' never a private indi-
vidual,13 permitted to arrest for misdemeanors not committed in his
presence, purely on the basis of suspicion or unsworn complaint.
Private individuals rarely exercise their authority to arrest. A
survey of cases reaching the appellate courts in the last two decades
discloses that, on an average, less than three cases a year have arisen
involving citizen's arrests. These cases fall primarily into two cate-
gories; those involving government agents who find themselves in an
"arrest" situation without a warrant and fall back on citizen's arrest
to apprehend their man;1 4 and those where retail store managers
use citizen's arrest to detain suspected shoplifters.15
Only a handful of cases have arisen in recent years involving the
traditional concept of an individual's arresting for a crime commit-
UState ex rel. Sadler v. District Court, 70 Mont. 378, 255 Pac. iooo (1924);
ALI Code Crim. Proc. 238-39 (Official Draft 1930).1
2A number of courts have held that statutes authorizing arrests without war-
rants for misdemeanors not committed in the presence of the arrester are un-
constitutional as an unlawful search. See In re Kellam, 55 Kan. 700, 41 Pac. 96o
(1895); Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 44 N.W 579 (1889); Gunderson v.
Struebing, 15 Wis. 173, 1o4 N.W. 149 (19o5). But see Hanser v. Bieber, 271 Mo.
326, 197 S.W. 68 (19i7).
1ALI Code Cnm. Proc. 238. (Official Draft 193o).
uIt should be noted that these arresters are trained in methods of arrest and
,their actions remain basically those of law enforcement officers. United States v.
Burgos, 269 F.gd 763 (2d Cir. 1959) (federal customs officers arrested alien);
Richardson v. United States, 217 F.9d 696 (8th Cir. 1954) (federal agents made ar-
rests for narcotics violation); United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 195o)
(federal agents made arrests for espionage); Dorsey v. United States, 174 F.2d 899
(5th Cir. 1949) (federal agents arrested holder of illegal sugar ration coupon);
United States v. Lindenfeld, 142 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1944) (federal agents made arrests
for narcotics violation); United States v. Hayden, 14o F. Supp. 429 (D. Md. 1956)
(federal agents arrested operator of illegal still); United States v. Guller, 1o F
Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (federal agents made arrests for narcotics violation);
United States v. Chodak, 68 F. Supp. 455 (D. Md. 1946) (federal agents made arrests
for violation of price ceilings); United States v. Strickland, 62 F. Supp. 468
(W.D.S.C. 1945) (federal agents arrested holder of illegal gas cupons); People v.
Burgess, 17o Cal. App. 2d 36, 338 P.2d 524 (1959) (state investigators arrested a
driver's license examiner); Smith v. Hubbard, 253 Minn. 215, 91 N.V.2d 756 (1958)
(constable arrested a traffic offender); Commonwealth v. Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484,
45 A.2d 235 (1946) (state officers made arrests for auto theft).
"Montgomery Ward g: Co. v. Freeman, 199 F.2d 720 (4 th Cir. 1952); Sima v.
Skaggs Payless Drug Center, Inc., 92 Idaho 387, 353 P.2d io85 (196o); Jefferson
Dry Goods Co. v. Stoess, 304 Ky. 73, 199 S.W.2d 994 (1947); Banks v. Town, Inc.,
98 So. ad 719 (La. App. 1957); Lester v. Albers Super Markets, Inc., 94 Ohio App.
313, 114 N.E.gd 529 (1952); Pilos v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 319 Mass. 475, 66 N.E.2d
576 (1946); Ira v. Columbia Food Co., 360 P.2d 622 (Ore. i96i); Martin v. Castner-
Knott Dry Goods Co., 27 Tenn. App. 421, 181 S.W.2d 638 (1944).
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ted in his presence and delivering the culprit to the authorities. 16 The
crimes for which the arrests have been made have generally been
varieties of breaches of the peace, with the arrester subduing the
trouble-maker until the arrival of authorties. In some cases the person
making the arrest was part of a posse organized in the classical manner
to track down a thief.17 Citizen posses are rare, however, having been
replaced by more effective professional policemen. A plausible explan-
ation of the scarcity of common law citizens' arrests would be the
fact that few citizens are fully aware of their authority to arrest and
fewer still are willing to risk the prosecution for false arrest which
will likely result if the arrest is adjudged unwarranted.
The decline of arrests by private individuals should not be con-
idered altogether undesirable. Except in rare instances official law
,u'Iforcement agencies are capable of making necessary arrests with-
out civilian aid. At the same time there seems to be no need to ex-
tend the law of arrest as it applies to police officers. Perhaps they
should be given the power to arrest for any misdemeanor committed in
their presence, whether or not it constitutes a breach of the peace.
There seems to be no justification, however, for permitting an arrest
for a misdemeanor not committed in the presence of the arresting
officer, as was the case in People v. Foster Such an arrest invades
"the sacred right of an individual to be protected from an arrest
founded upon mere oral complaints where petty crimes of the mis-
demeanor type are involved. ."Is
WVILLIAm H. CLARK, Jr.
28Lma v. Lawler, 63 F. Supp. 446 (E.D. Va. 1945) (citizen's arrest of unruly
sailor); Ogulin v. Jeffries, 121 Cal. App. 2d 211, 263 P.-d 75 (1953) (woman ar-
rested man for attacking her); Thacker v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 702, 221 S.V.2d
682 (1949) (citizen's arrest of man shooting into bus, killing the driver); Com-
monwealth v. Lussier, 333 Mass. 83, 128 N.E.2d 569 (1955) (thief arrested by citizen
as he ran from robbed liquor store); Bellinger v. State, 2o6 Misc. 575, 134 N.Y.S.2d
104 (1954) (hotel operator arrested trouble-maker in parking lot); Oklahoma Ry.
Co. v. Sandford, 258 P.2d 604 (Okla. 1953) (bus driver arrested intoxicated motorist);
Wingfield v. State, 81 Okla. Crim. 146, 16o P.2d 945 (1945) (citizen's arrest of
prowler); Commonwealth ex rel. Garrison v. Burke, 378 Pa. 344, io6 A.2d 587
(1954) (citizen's arrest of burglar).
2TState v. Parker, 55 Mo. 916, igg S.W.2d 338 (1947).
"From Judge Frossel's dissent in People v. Foster, supra note i at 399.
